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RECENT DECISIONS

flected by the present method of accounting, and as to when the present
method did or did not clearly reflect income. While this issue has not
been taken up squarely by any court as yet, there are cases such as the
instant case and Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner2 where the
court has taken it upon itself to decide when there is or is not distortion
of income. As the law stands today, there is a clear split in the Circuits,
the instant case being handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals of
the Eighth Circuit and the Boylston decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals of the First Circuit. Hence, it is difficult to forecast which
rule will ultimately prevail if the Supreme Court undertakes to resolve
the conflict. While there are strong policy reasons for the result of the
instant case, there would seem to be abundant authority for a contrary
ruling.
ALFRED A. HEON
Unauthorized Practice: Conveyancing as Practice of Law Under
Sec. 59.513, Wis. Stats.-On May 8, 1957 the Wisconsin Legislature
published a statute which requires, as a condition of recordation,
that every domestic instrument other than a will or a court decree,
which in any way affects the title to or an interest in real property,
must incorporate the name of the draftsman.1
The legislative purpose in enacting such a statute is subtly towfold.
Mr. Phillip Haberman, 2 one of the draftsmen of the bill, has pointed
out in a discussion of the bill with the present author, that the bill was
intended to facilitate the detection of those who are drafting such instruments in violation of sec. 256.30(2),3 as well as to enable any examiner of such instruments to contact its draftsman to resolve certain
ambiguities. Wisconsin, like all other states, has adopted a system of
well-defined licensing requirements for the practice of law. 4

The

28218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
1 Wis. STATS. §59.513 "Including name of person drafting instrument:
(1) No instrument by which the title to real estate of any interest
therein or lien thereon, is conveyed, created, encumbered, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of, shall be recorded by the register of deeds unless
the name of the person who, or governmental agency which, drafted
such instrument is printed, typewritten, stamped or written thereon
in a legible manner. An instrument complies with this section if it contains a statement in the following form: 'This instrument was drafted
'
[name]
by
(2) This section does not apply to an instrument executed before the
effective date of this section, nor to
(a) A decree, order, judgment, or writ of any court
(b) A will or death certificate
(c) An instrument executed or acknowledged outside of this state."
2Secretary of Wisconsin Bar Association.
3 "It is presumed that the bill is aimed at persons drawing documents who
have not been admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin." From a letter
signed by the "Sec'ry-Wis. Recorders Ass'n" found in the Official
Drafting Record of §59.513.
4 Wis. STATS.

§256.28 (1955).
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legislature has also provided a penalty for those who attempt to practice
law without being so licensed, and defines the practice of law in the
following terms in sec. 256.30(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes:
"Every person who shall appear as agent, representative or
attorney, for or on behalf of any other person, or any firm, copartnership, association or corporation in any action or proceeding in or before any court of record, court commissioner, or
judicial tribunal of the United States, or any state, or who shall
otherwise, in or out of court for compensation or pecuniary
reward give professional legal advice not incidental to his usual
or ordinary business, or render any legal service for any other
person, or any firm, copartnership, association or corporation,
shall be deemed to be practicing law within the meaning of this
section."
The phrase, "not incidental to his ordinary business," appearing in
sec. 256.30(2), might be thought to qualify the broad inclusions of the
other clauses. However, in State ex rel Junior Association of the Milwaukee Bar. v. Rice5 the Court refused to adopt a contention to that
effect. The Court gave independent force to the prohibition against
rendering "any legal service" stating:
"In our opinion, the contention is unsound for the reason that a
lay person may not engage in a business which involves the
rendering of 'legal service' and then claim immunity because the
giving of the professional
legal advice was incidental to his usual
6
or ordinary business."
The Court went on to say:
"A number of courts have from time to time, in deciding a given
case, attempted to define practice of law, but the general trend
of judicial decision is to determine each case of unauthorized
7
practice of law largely upon its own particular facts."
Insofar as the drafting of a conveyance is a process of merely filling
in a printed form, the last-cited decision contains additional indications
of the law. Citing a Missouri decision, 8 the Court held:
"... that if in effecting a settlement of a claim arising under a
policy of casualty insurance an adjuster fills in blank spaces of a
printed form prepared by counsel for the company, such act
does not constitute the practice of law."9 [Emphasis supplied]
The impact of the emphasized language will be more readily appreciated on a subsequent analysis of sister-state decisions.
It is an elementary principle of law that if an indviidual draft an
instrument for his own benefit, his conduct does not constitute the
5236 Wis. 38, 294 N.W. 550 (1940).
6 236 Wis. 38, at 43, 294 N.W. 550, at 556 (1940).
7 Ibid.
s Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 334 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945 (
9236 Wis. at 45, 294 N.W. at 558.

).
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unauthorized practice of law,10 just as one appearing in his own behalf
in an actual court proceeding is not unlawfully practicing law."I
The basic question to be resolved in determining the efficacy of the
new statute is whether the drafting of the instruments specified therein
is, de facto, practicing law within the meaning of sec. 256.30(2). This
question takes us into what might be termed a "twilight zone" between
what constitutes the practice of law and what does not.'2 The decisions
of sister states are of limited persuasiveness, because such decisions
are substantially tempered, if not totally controlled, by the pertinentand different-statutes of those states.
Although the decisions of other states are conflicting, an analysis
of such decisions would afford an opportunity to determine at least the
crucial fact criteria on which these decisions turn-in other words to
pick out the posts on which the fence of conflict is constructed. There
is an occasional decision which seems to hold unequivocally either that
the drafting, or filling-in of blanks in printed forms, of instruments
relating to realty by a layman constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law;13 or, that it does not constitute such practice.'4 However the
majority of the decisions lie in the area between these polarities.
In a very recent Colorado case,' 5 the Denver Bar Association and
the Colorado Bar Association brought three separate actions to enjoin
a corporation, a realty investment company, and an individual, all licensed real estate brokers, from preparing certain legal documents, and
from giving advice to the parties to such documents as to the legal
effect thereof, all of which, the plaintiffs alleged, constituted the unlawful practice of law. The issues in each case were substantially the
same. The same alleged objectionable acts were performed by each
of the defendants. The court affirmatively answers the question:
"Does the preparation of receipts and options, deeds, promissory
notes, deeds of trust, mortgages, releases of encumbrances,
leases, notice terminating tenancies, demands to pay rent or
vacate by completing standard and approved forms, coupled
10 People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y.334, at 337, 125 N.E. 671, at 674 (1919) :

"Thus a man may plead his own case in court, or draft his own will or
legal papers."
"Osborne v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 ( );
Funded Debt Commrs. v. Younger, 29 Cal. 1447, 87 Am. Dec. 164 (
);
Hench v. Todhunter, 7 Harr. & J. (Md.) 275, 16 Am. Dec. 300
.);
Abernathy v. Burns, 206 N.C. 370, 173 S.E. 899 (
).
12 People ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Jersin, 101 Colo. 406, 74 P.2d 688 (1937).
' 3Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Assoc., 46 So.2d 605 (1950).

14La Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948). In

this case conveyancing looked on as a field unto itself, free and distinct
from law. "He [the conveyancer] does not hold himself out as a lawyer engaged in practicing law."
15The Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. The Denver Bar Association;
Van Schaak & Company v. The Denver Bar Association; and John F. Bruno
v. The Denver Bar Association, Colo. , 312 P.2d 998 (1957).
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with the giving of explanation or advice as to the legal effect
thereof, constitute the practice of law ?",

Although finding this conduct to constitute the practice of law, the
court held that this was not an unauthorized practice for, as the court
said:
"We feel that the weight of authority and especially the more
recent decisions, sanctions our holding that the acts of which
complaint is made, done without separate charge therefor by
licensed real estate brokers only in connection with their established business, and in behalf of their customers and in connection with a bona fide real estate transaction
which they are
17
handling as brokers, should not be enjoined."
On the same day, the Colorado Supreme Court, in actions brought
by the same plaintiffs, sustained the position of the lower court in
granting injunctions against the defendants, an abstract company and a
title insurance company, restraining them from selling a real estate
"closing service"; but, in light of their earlier holding of that day,
struck a provisionary ruling of the trial court which prohibited the
Title Guarantee Company from preparing documents pertaining to real
estate loans, which it was certain it was going to grant."' With respect
to the "closing service," which consisted of affording space and accommodations for closing conferences, including preparation of deeds,
promissory notes, deeds and mortgages, releases of trust deeds and
mortgages, preparation of settlement sheets, and distribution of the
money and the documents, the court held:
"It is apparent that preparation of the documents in question
where title insurance is not applied for or written has nothing
whatsoever to do with defendant's business of abstracting and
insuring titles to real estate. Preparation of these documents
constitutes the practice of law and a power not granted to (he
defendants expressly or by implication under the corporation
laws of this state. Preparation of these documents is not necessary to defendants' abstract or title insurance business, it is a
separate, distinct and other business, much of which constitutes
the practice of law."' 9
In Cain v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo,20 the
plaintiffs attempted to enjoin defendant from preparing for others
chattel mortgages, bills of sale, crop contracts, deeds, real estate mortgages, extensions, and assignments of rents. In denying the injunction
the court said:
"A careful study of the many decisions of the courts relative to
16 312 P.2d at 1004.
17Id. at 1007.
18 Title Guaranty Company v. Denver Bar Association, P.2d 1011 (1957).
19 Id. at 1015.
2066 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936).

Colo. -

, 312
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what constitutes practicing law, when applied to the facts in this
case, leads us to the conclusion that a person who is not a member of the bar may draw instruments such as simple deeds, mortgages, promissory notes, and bills of sale when these instruments
are incident to transactions in which such person is interested,
provided no charge is made therefore : ' 21
In Ingham County Bar Association v. Walter Neller Company et
al.,22 a Michigan decision, the issue with which the court was confronted was:
"Have the respondents (realtors) practiced law or engaged in
the law business contrray to MSA 27.81 by reason of their having completed and filled out printed forms of offers to purchase
real estate, warranty deeds, quit claim deeds, land contracts,
land contract assignments, leases, and notices to terminate
tenancy incidental to their handling and consumation of real
estate transactions in which respondents were acting as real
estate brokers, no separate charge having been made therefor ?23
The court concluded:
"There cannot be any objection to a licensed broker doing such
work 24without compensation when it is incidental to his business."

An analysis of the foregoing decisions suggests three main fact
criteria:
(1) Whether the work was a mere incident to the business of the one
preparing the instrument?
(2) Whether compensation was paid for the work?
(3) Whether the work consisted of the mere filling-in of -blanks of
a printed form or the compiling of the whole instrument?
While these are the controlling questions, there is no unanimity of
interpretation as to their weight and effect, notwithstanding the similarity of circumstances involved. The majority of decisions, however,
seem to have adopted the view that if the drafting consists of merely
filling-in blanks, and is done incidentally to the business of the drafter,
and is not done for compensation, that such drafting does not constitute
the unauthorized practice of law.25 The acquittal on a charge of unau211d. at 723.
22343 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955).
231d.at 715.
24Id. at 721.
25 See cases cited notes 15, 18, 20, 22 supra, also People v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn.
642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940) (As ancillary to the closing of a real estate transaction a broker may draw the ordinary instruments of conveyance) ; Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941)
(Filling-in blanks in "offer or purchase" forms by a real estate broker through
its officers was not enjoined; the forms prepared by an attorney) ; c.f. Childs
v. Smetzer, 312 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934) (Defendant, a notary public and

stenographer, who advertised herself as conveyancer; her practice was enjoined).
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thorized practice hence requires that the person charged satisfy all three
of the basic tests above suggested. But when one of these basic facts is
changed, the decisions vary accordingly until a point of irreconcilable
conflict is reached.

26

Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court has never been called upon to
answer the basic question, and since the cases in point are in conflict,
no definite conclusion can be reached as to the status in Wisconsin of
real estate brokers or salesmen, officers of banks, lending institutions
etc. who draft such instruments.
What then is the efficacy of the new sec. 59.513? Warren H.
Resch, the other co-draftsman of the bill, writing in the "Unauthorized
Practice News," has perhaps given as good an answer as can be found.
"The editor of this publication [Mr. Resch] can state that in the
very short time which has elapsed since the enactment of the
above statute, he has, in his capacity as an Assistant Attorney
General for Wisconsin, received many inquiries from banks,
trust companies, savings and loan associations, other institutions,
and individuals as to the scope of the statute, and it is quite apparent that many persons who have been drafting instruments
for recording with little thought of their legal right to do so, are
now becoming quite apprehensive about the effect of this statute
although27 on its face it prohibits no one from drafting instruments."

JAMES.

26

G. DOYLE

Compare In re Matthews, 58 Idaho 772, at 780, 79 P.2d 535, at 539 (1938)
"It would be an anomaly to hold that every individual, abstracter, realtor,
banker, title insurance company, etc., who fills out a blank deed, mortgage,
bill of sale, contract, or such instrument and receives compensation therefor
is engaged in the practice of law..." and Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26. 247 S.W.
2d 855 (1952) in which the defendant realtor executed conveyancing forms in
connection with transactions in which he was the broker, making a separate
charge therefore. The court proscribed the charge therefor, but not the
practice of executing the forms.

27 XXIII UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 44 (June 1957).

